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I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A. Scope
This memorandum discusses the options available to the International Criminal

Court to enforce the legal obligations of States Parties.* Furthermore, it examines and
discusses the obligations of the United Nations Security Council when States Parties
refuse to enforce their obligations under the Rome Statute for cases referred to the ICC
by the Security Council.
B. Summary of Conclusions
It is obvious from the ICC’s purpose and structure that full cooperation of States
Parties is not only inherent in the Court but also essential to its proper functioning. The
drafters of the Rome Statute envisioned a comprehensive system of international justice
that is based first and foremost on individual States fulfilling their obligations to
investigate and prosecute international crimes. Where this is for some reason impossible,
the ICC exists as a court of last resort. Based on a purely textual reading of the Rome
Statute, States Parties have a largely unqualified obligation to cooperate with the Court
with respect to every aspect of the Rome Statute.
Non-States Parties – States that are not a party to the Rome Statute, regardless of
whether they have signed it – have no similar legal obligations under the Rome Statute.
Despite this relative lack of explicit obligations for non-States Parties in the Rome
Statute, there are circumstances in which they have some legal obligations to the Court.
*

Discuss the options available to the ICC to enforce the legal obligations of State Parties.
Examine and discuss the obligations of the Security Council when State Parties refuse to
enforce their obligations under the Rome Treaty for cases referred to the ICC by the
Security Council.
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An example of such a circumstance is a case that has been referred to the Court by the
United Nations Security Council.
In much the same way that the Rome Statute generally creates no legal
obligations for non-States Parties, it creates no explicit legal obligations for the Security
Council. However, while the Security Council and the ICC are independent entities, the
Relationship Agreement governing their relationship and the nature of their respective
missions lead to a conclusion that the Security Council has certain legal obligations to the
Court, at least with respect to referral cases.
In circumstances where the existence of legal obligations – whether those of
States Parties, non-States Parties, the Security Council, or another actor – is arguable,
actors should recognize a moral obligation to cooperate with the Court, regardless of their
legal relationship to the institution. Despite the existence of obligations – legal or moral,
explicit or implicit – on actors to cooperate with the ICC, the Court has absolutely no
inherent enforcement mechanisms, and as such is consistently subject to the political
realities of other actors in international law (specifically, the Security Council and
individual States, whether or not they are party to the Rome Statute). In order for the
Court to succeed in fulfilling its mandate, solutions that appreciate but do not yield to
these political factors must be considered.
II.

Factual Background
The ICC is a permanent, treaty based, international criminal court established to

help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the

8

international community.1 The Rome Statute, which was adopted on 17 July 1998 by 120
States, governs the ICC; after ratification by 60 States, the Rome Statute entered into
force on 1 July 2002.2 States that have signed and ratified the Rome Statute are known as
States Parties; states that have not are referred to as non-States Parties. This distinction is
critical to the issues discussed in this paper, as the legal obligations a state has to the
Court are directly related to its status with respect to the Rome Statute.
The ICC is an international institution completely independent of the United
Nations. Structurally, it consists of the Presidency, the Office of the Prosecutor, the
Judicial Divisions, the Registry, and the Assembly of States Parties, which serves as its
legislative body. It is funded by contributions from States Parties and by voluntary
contributions from governments, international organizations, individuals, and entities.3
The ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
potentially the crime of aggression,4 provided the crimes were committed after 1 July
2002.5 With respect to these crimes, the preamble to the Rome Statute affirms that they
must not go unpunished and “that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking

“About the ICC”, available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the
%20court/Pages/about%20the%20co urt.aspx> [hereinafter ICC Website].
1

2

Id.

3

Id.

4

While the crime of aggression appears in Article 5(1), the Article 15 bis and 15 ter
amendments concerning how and when the Court can exercise its jurisdiction over crimes
of aggression have not been ratified or accepted by the requisite 30 States Parties.
5

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5(1) and 11(1), 17 July 1998, 37
I.L.M.
999
[hereinafter
Rome
Statute],
available
at
http://www.icccpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf.
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measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.”6 A
fundamental element of the ICC is complementarity;7 further to its purpose of ending
impunity and bringing perpetrators of international crimes to justice, the ICC is not meant
to replace courts of national jurisdiction, but to complement them.
According to the Rome Statute, there are three ways to initiate prosecutions and
investigations before the ICC. A State Party can refer a situation to the Prosecutor in
accordance with Article 14; the Security Council can refer a situation to the Prosecutor in
accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; and the Prosecutor
may initiate an investigation proprio motu on the basis of information received.8 The
Rome Statute delineates the general obligations of States Parties with respect to the Court
and to normal cases before it in detail in Parts IX and X. Security Council referrals are
discussed briefly in the Rome Statute, but only to the extent that the Statute provides for
such referrals.
However, because of the unique relationship between the United Nations and the
ICC, the two institutions entered into a Negotiated Relationship Agreement on 4 October
2004, which governs their relationship and establishes the legal foundation for
cooperation within their respective mandates.9 It is this Relationship Agreement that fully
establishes a framework of cooperation between the Court and the United Nations; it
6

Rome Statute, Preamble.

7

The principle of complementarity is enshrined in Article 17 of the Rome Statute;
complementarity is discussed further in Section III(B) of this paper.
8

Rome Statute, arts. 13, 14, and 15.

9

Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the
United Nations [hereinafter Relationship Agreement], entered into force 4 October 2004.
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addresses specific issues such as how individual representatives of UN agencies (e.g., the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights) may interact with the Court, as well as the
broader issue of how the Security Council specifically may interact with the Court. The
Relationship Agreement codifies several general principles, for example, that the United
Nations and the Court respect each other’s status and mandate.10 The Relationship
Agreement also recognizes a general mutual obligation of cooperation and coordination
in Article 3, stating:
The United Nations and the Court agree that, with a view to facilitating the
effective discharge of their respective responsibilities, they shall cooperate
closely, whenever appropriate, with each other and consult each other on
matters of mutual interest pursuant to the provisions of the present
Agreement and in conformity with the respective provisions of the Charter
and the Statute.11
III.

Legal Discussion
A. Legal Obligations of States Parties
According to the Rome Statute, States Parties “shall, in accordance with the

provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”12 The general obligation to
cooperate is sweeping and unambiguous in scope; it explicitly imposes a legal obligation
on States Parties with respect to every part of the Rome Statute. In addition to this
general obligation to cooperate, the Rome Statute endows the Court with the authority to

10

Relationship Agreement, art. 2(3).

11

Relationship Agreement, art. 3.

12

Rome Statute, art. 86.

11

make requests to States Parties for cooperation.13 Furthermore, subsequent articles in Part
IX of the Statute delineate specific obligations of States Parties. For example, States
Parties have an explicit obligation to comply with Court requests for arrest and
surrender14 and to assist the Court with respect to the taking of evidence, the questioning
of any person being investigated or prosecuted, and the execution of searches and
seizures.15
States Parties also have obligations with respect to enforcement pursuant to Part X
of the Rome Statute. These obligations generally take the form of accepting and
imprisoning sentenced persons. Enforcement obligations are situational and not uniform
among all States Parties. Article 103(1) states that “[a] sentence of imprisonment shall be
served in a State designated by the Court form a list of States which have indicated to the
Court their willingness to accepted sentenced persons.”16 This language clearly indicates
that States are somewhat autonomous in determining the degree to which they aid in
enforcement. However, Article 103(3) both acknowledges the discretionary nature of the
Court’s designation of sentence location and specifically notes that this discretion shall
take into account, among other factors, the following:
The principle that States Parties should share the responsibility for
enforcing sentences of imprisonment, in accordance with principles of
equitable distribution, as provided in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.17
13

Rome Statute, art. 87(1)(a).

14

Rome Statute, art. 89(1).

15

Rome Statute, art. 93(1)(b), (c), and (h).

16

Rome Statute, art. 103(1). (emphasis added)

17

Rome Statute, art. 103(3)(a).
12

This clause reiterates the idea that States Parties’ cooperation is essential to the effective
functioning of the Court.
The threshold obligation that the Rome Statute creates for States Parties is to
enact national implementing legislation. Because of the nature of the Court and its
mandate according to the Rome Statute, it cannot function effectively unless treaty
obligations have been carried into effect in national law to provide the Court with the
necessary assistance and cooperation.18 This fact itself is recognized in the Rome Statute,
which notes that States Parties “shall ensure that there are procedures available under
their national law for all of the forms of cooperation” described in Part IX.19 This is yet
another example of the principle of complementarity at work in the Rome Statute; the
Court’s effectiveness depends in every way on States Parties fulfilling their legal
obligations under the Rome Statute, and the foundation of this is the criminalization of
ICC crimes on a national level.
In addition to an obligation to enact implementing legislation with respect to
complementarity and cooperation, States Parties have an obligation under Article 70(4) to
enact national legislation “penalizing offences against the integrity of its own
investigative or judicial process to offences against the administration of justice referred
to in this article.”20 This gives the Court the authority to prosecute individuals for

Roy S. Lee (ed), States’ Responses to Issues Arising from the ICC Statute:
Constitutional, Sovereignty, Judicial Cooperation and Criminal Law (2005), p. xxi.
18

19

Rome Statute, art. 88.

20

Rome Statute, art. 70(4).

13

interfering with the operations of the Court; the procedures for such prosecutions are
described in detail in Chapter 9 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Court.
Finally, Article 127 imposes an obligation on States even if they are to withdraw
from the Rome Statute. After providing for the procedure a State Party must follow in
order to withdraw from the Rome Statute, Article 127 states:
A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the
obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute,
including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its
withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection
with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which the
withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced
prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it
prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was
already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the
withdrawal became effective.21
Although the post-withdrawal obligation is not absolute, it is fairly sweeping and
illustrates that States Parties have a continuing obligation to the Court that is
theoretically unencumbered by the political whims of a withdrawing State.
B. Factors Complicating States Parties’ Exercise of Their Obligations
As of 2015, 123 States have ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute; a minority of
these States has enacted national legislation pursuant to Article 88 of the Rome Statute.
According to the President of the Court, as of September 2015, “possibly as many as half
of all States Parties do not have adequate national laws criminalizing the acts contained in
the Rome Statute.” 22 This is perhaps not the most significant practical obstacle to the

21

Rome Statute, art. 127(2).

22

Judge Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, President of the International Criminal Court,
Keynote speech at Seminar, “From Ratification to Action: The Importance of Full
Implementation of the Rome Statute”, delivered at The Hague, 16 September 2015,
14

effectiveness of the ICC. However, in order to establish an effective basis for ICC
investigations and prosecutions, all States Parties must create and implement national
legislation allowing such investigations and prosecutions to take place. Implementing
legislation is closely linked to both cooperation and complementarity, and it is “essential
for the effectiveness of the Court’s mandate.”23 Implementing legislation is clearly more
than a formality, and it is a threshold step in effective investigation and prosecution.
However, it is not the sole factor determining the Court’s effectiveness. Without financial
resources, judicial capacity or the means to create it, and political will, implementing
legislation alone is rendered largely meaningless.
Another potential complicating factor in the exercise of States Parties’ obligations
is built in to the Rome Statute. Article 93 of the Statute provides for a significant
exception to the otherwise sweeping obligation to cooperate by allowing a State Party to
“deny a request for assistance, in whole or in part, only if the request concerns the
production of any documents or disclosure of evidence which relates to its national
security.”24 While there is certain criteria States Parties must meet in order to exercise
this right to deny Court requests, it is notable that the Rome Statute does not contain a
definition of “national security” or an explanation of exactly when national security is or
is not implicated by a given situation. This exception is fairly generous on its face, but it
is critical to recognize that the exception is narrow in terms of which obligations it can

available at https://www.icc- cpi.int/ iccdocs/ presidency/ 150916_ Keynote _remarks _at
_seminar_on_full_implementation_of_RS.pdf.
23

Id.

24

Rome Statute, art. 93(4).
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affect. It allows States Parties to circumvent their legal obligations only with respect to
document production and evidence disclosure; the language in the Rome Statute does not
include any mention of other obligations, such as arresting or transferring an individual.
Document production and evidence disclosure are not insignificant, but they are only two
of the numerous obligations States Parties have under the Rome Statute. The fact that this
exception exists explicitly with respect to documents and evidence seems to imply that
national security cannot be used as a reason for noncompliance with any of the other
legal obligations of a State Party under the Rome Statute.
There are other ways in which States Parties may attempt to circumvent their
obligations to the Court. Article 94 allows for a State to postpone cooperation “if the
immediate execution of a request would interfere with an ongoing investigation or
prosecution of a case different from that to which the request relates.”25 While this
provision might seem to allow states to avoid Court requests, qualifying language states
that the postponement is limited by both time and necessity.26 Furthermore, the allowance
of postponement is arguably grounded in complementarity, as it appears to be seeking to
avoid ICC interference with national judicial processes.
Similarly, complementarity itself is a factor complicating the exercise of States
Parties’ legal obligations. To be sure, complementarity was essential to the Court’s
establishment and is and will continue to be one of the Court’s most important
characteristics. Article 17 of the Rome Statute addresses admissibility of cases before the
25

Rome Statute, art. 94(1).

Article 94(1) goes on to state that “the postponement shall be no longer than is
necessary to complete the relevant investigation or prosecution in the requested State,”
and that “before making a decision to postpone, the requested State should consider
whether the assistance may be immediately provided subject to certain conditions.”
26
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Court, stating that where a State with jurisdiction over a case is investigating or
prosecuting it or has previously investigated or prosecuted it, the Court shall determine
that the case is inadmissible.27 The exception to complementarity is that a case may be
deemed admissible where the State with jurisdiction is “unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution.”28 The different theories of complementarity
and the corresponding drawbacks and merits thereof have been discussed elsewhere at
length; for the purposes of this paper, it is merely important to note that complementarity
complicates the relationship of States Parties to the Court.
An example of this complication is the admissibility challenge made by the
Libyan government in the case of Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah AlSenussi. The Libyan government initially sought postponement of the Surrender Request
of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, in accordance with Article 94 of the Rome Statute (discussed
above), pending the completion of national proceedings in relation to other crimes against
Gaddafi.29 The Libyan Government stated that it:
regard[ed] the trial of Saif Al-Islam and Abdullah Al-Senussi as a matter
of the highest national importance, not only in bringing justice for the
Libyan people but also in demonstrating that the new Libyan justice
system is capable of conducting fair trials (that meet all applicable
international standards) in complex cases.30
27

Rome Statute, art. 17.

28

Rome Statute, art. 17(1)(a).

29

ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision Regarding the Second Request by the Government
of Libya for Postponement of the Surrender of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11,
4 April 2012, para. 3.
Government of Libya’s Appeal Against the “Decision Regarding the Second Request
by the Government of Libya for Postponement of the Surrender of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi,
ICC-01/11-01/11-103, 10 April 2012, para. 3.
30

17

On 1 May 2012, the Government of Libya filed an Article 19 admissibility
challenge before the Pre-Trial Chamber I. 31 This challenge was ultimately
denied,

32

although a similar admissibility challenge for Al-Senussi was

successful.33 The latter challenge was the first time the Pre-Trial Chamber found
in favor of a government challenge to ICC jurisdiction over a case.
Libya highlights the complexities of complementarity in practice. The
above-mentioned decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber, or even the subsequent
confirmation of ICC jurisdiction by the Pre-Trial Chamber in May 2014,34 did not
settle the issue. Libya continued to conduct domestic trial proceedings against
both Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, ultimately sentencing Gaddafi to death in absentia
in July 2015.35 The proceedings continued through sentencing despite orders by
the ICC to cooperate with respect to its case against Gaddafi, specifically to
surrender Gaddafi to the Court and to return original documents seized by Libyan

31

Application on behalf of the Government of Libya pursuant to Article 19 of the Rome
Statute, ICC-01/11-01/11, 1 May 2012.
32

Pre-Trial Chamber I, Public Redacted Decision on the Admissibility of the Case
Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11, 31 May 2013.
33

Pre-Trial Chamber I, Public Redacted Decision on the Admissibility of the Case
Against Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11, 11 October 2013.
34

Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Libya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial
Chamber I of 31 May entitled “Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif AlIslam Gaddafi”, ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 4, 21 May 2014.
35

David D. Kirkpatrick, Son of Muammar Al-Gaddafi Sentenced to Death in Libya, The
New York Times, 28 July 2015, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/
world/africa/seif-al-islam-el-qaddafi-death-sentence-libya.html?_r=0>.
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authorities from Gaddafi’s former counsel.36 In response to clear noncooperation,
the Pre-Trial Chamber referred the situation to the Security Council pursuant to
the Court’s authority under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute, further discussed
infra at the end of this section.
Finally, political factors have proven the most significant factor complicating the
fulfillment of legal obligations by States Parties. It has been emphasized that the effective
functioning of the ICC depends on the cooperation of other actors in international law,
and in particular on the cooperation of States Parties. However, the ICC does not exist in
a vacuum; despite the promise and fanfare surrounding its establishment,37 the Court is
not immune from the complex realities of international power politics. M. Cherif
Bassiouni, an instrumental figure in international criminal law in general and the creation
of the ICC in particular, has said:
The success of the ICC, like all human institutions, will depend on those
who will be a part of it. But they will need the resources and political
support of many states to make this important institution work
effectively.38
The reality of international politics is that there have been circumstances under which
cooperation with the ICC has not been in the best interests of one or more States Parties,

36

Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Non-Compliance by Libya with Requests for
Cooperation by the Court and Referring the Matter to the United Nations Security
Council, ICC-01/11-01/11, 10 December 2014, para. 4.
37

At the Ceremony for the Opening of the Signature of the Rome Statute, M. Cherif
Bassiouni stated: “The ICC reminds governments that realpolitik, which sacrifices justice
at the altar of political settlements, is no longer accepted.” M. Cherif Bassiouni, The
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary History (1998).
38

M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary
History (1998).
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in their own view. In some cases, as with the situation in Libya discussed above, political
concerns are intricately linked to complementarity, further complicating the situation.
The drafters of the Rome Statute did not ignore this political reality; article 87 addresses
the issue of what should happen in the case of non-compliance with a binding order of the
Court:
When a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by
Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing
Court from exercising its functions and powers under this Statute,
Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to
Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred
matter to the Court, to the Security Council.39

the
the
the
the
the

Unfortunately, Article 87(7) highlights the ICC’s lack of a meaningful
enforcement mechanism. Even in the face of absolute noncompliance by a State
Party, the Court has only the power to acknowledge that such noncompliance has
occurred, or to alert the Security Council to such an occurrence. The Assembly of
States Parties, as the Court’s legislative body, has the authority to do such things
as consider the Court’s budget and alter the number of judges. 40 It has no
authority to take action against noncompliant States Parties.
C. Obligations of Non-States Parties
The creation of the ICC undoubtedly changed the landscape of international
justice, and in doing so, has arguably made it more difficult for states to take deliberate
political action to shield persons from accountability, regardless of whether or not they

39

Rome Statute, art. 87(7).

40

Rome Statute, art. 112.
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are a party to the Rome Statute.41 Despite this potential impact, however, the Rome
Statute does not create new legal obligations for non-states parties. This is apparent based
first on a conspicuous lack of obligations, explicit or implicit, in the Rome Statute. There
is only a general reference to cooperation by non-States Parties, stating that “the Court
may invite any State not party to this Statute to provide assistance under this Part on the
basis of an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement with such State or any other appropriate
basis.”42
This is also apparent based on a fundamental rule of international law. The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declares that a “treaty does not create either
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”43 It is true that nationals of
non-States Parties are considered to be within the jurisdiction of the Court when they
commit crimes on the territory of states parties.44 However, it is an accepted principle of
international law that states may prosecute foreign nationals for crimes occurring on their
territory; the existence of the ICC merely creates an additional forum for these
prosecutions to take place. It is also true that a State not party to the Rome Statute “may,
by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court”
with respect to crimes committed on its territory or by one of its nationals.45 By formally
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accepting the Court’s jurisdiction in this way, the State thus creates an obligation on itself
to “cooperate with the Court without delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.”46
This has two obvious implications. The first is that unlike States Parties, which have
unequivocally accepted the jurisdiction of the Court by becoming a Party to the Rome
Statute,47 non-States Parties are generally autonomous in deciding when they will and
will not accept the Court’s jurisdiction. The second is that once a non-States Party has
formally accepted the Court’s jurisdiction, that State’s legal obligations to the Court are
not meaningfully different from those of a State Party.
There appears to be one significant exception to this autonomy. The exclusion of
referral cases from Article 12(2) suggests that either (1) a non-State Party cannot
formally accept the Court’s jurisdiction in referral cases, or (2) the non-State Party’s
formal acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction is not necessary in referral cases.48 The
former conclusion would ultimately lead to an absurd result; this would render ICC
investigation and prosecution of referral cases ineffective before they even begin, because
referral cases most often involve non-States Parties. Therefore, it must be concluded that
a non-State Party need not formally accept the ICC’s jurisdiction in a referral case; this
jurisdiction is rather implied based on the authority of the Security Council and a rational
interpretation of Article 12(2).
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It has been suggested that due to the nature of the ICC and the Rome Statute,
cooperation by non-States Parties is not merely voluntary in nature, but is instead
obligatory as customary international law.49 While this suggestion is premature, as will be
shown infra in Section III(D)(1), an analysis of its underlying rationale leads to a more
complete understanding of the obligations of non-States Parties with respect to the ICC.
Article 25 of the UN Charter provides for the creation of a binding obligation on all UN
member states through the passage of a Security Council resolution.50 Based on this
obligation, implicit in a Security Council referral is the obligation for all UN member
states to cooperate with the ICC in the case’s investigation and prosecution. The Security
Council exercised this authority in its resolution referring the situation in Sudan to the
ICC, noting that non-States Parties have no obligations under the Rome Statute but
nevertheless “urging all States and concerned regional and other international
organizations to cooperate fully.”51
Another way in which non-States Parties are thought by some to have an implicit
obligation to cooperate with the ICC is based on the nature of the crimes in the Court’s
jurisdiction. For example, one scholar has gone so far as to state that non-States Parties
“are obliged to co-operate with [the ICC] not only in instances of referrals by the UN
Security Council but also under the provisions in the Geneva Conventions whereby states
49
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must ‘respect and ensure respect’ for international humanitarian law.”52 This is to say that
because failing to cooperate with the Court may, in the broadest sense, amount to a
failure to follow established principles of customary international law, states should
recognize cooperation as inherent to their other obligations in customary international
law. Despite recognizing this obligation, Wenqi notes that “it is still not very clear from
the four Geneva Conventions which steps states should take and through which
procedures,” but goes on to say that regardless, “an obligation to co-operate should be
understood as requiring non-party states to make an effort not to block actions taken by
the ICC to punish or prevent serious violations of the Geneva Conventions.”53 In a
similar vein, Goran Sluiter has noted that international criminal adjudication (in the form
of the ICC, among other tribunals) “constitute[s] a contribution to the enforcement of
fundamental norms of international humanitarian law and international human rights
law.”54 Regardless of the existence of an implicit or explicit legal obligation to cooperate
with the ICC, a state that has not ratified the Rome Statute has little if any practical
incentive to cooperate with the Court.
The issue of ascertaining what, if any, obligations non-States Parties have under
the Rome Statute comes up primarily in cases referred to the Court by the Security
Council. Because the authority of the Security Council to refer cases does not require a
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showing of any link between the crime(s) committed and a State Party, the relevant State
in a referral case is likely to be a non-party to the Rome Statute.55
D. Obligations of the Security Council
Pursuant to the Relationship Agreement, the United Nations “undertakes to
cooperate with the Court and to provide to the Court such information or documents as
the Court may request” pursuant to the Rome Statute.56 This “undertaking” is notably
different from the blanket obligation on States Parties to cooperate with the Court; it is
qualified “with due regard to [the United Nations’] responsibilities and competence under
the Charter [of the United Nations] and subject to its rules as defined under the applicable
international law.”57 This qualification appears to lend the UN’s cooperation a
discretionary element; this discretion has been illustrated in the UN’s cooperation, or lack
thereof, with the Court in the past. While the obligations of the Security Council are
drastically different from those of States Parties, the ICC is in a sense dependent on the
Security Council in the same way it is dependent on States Parties. This is so because
Security Council referrals to the ICC allow for an expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction to
crimes that would otherwise not fall within the Rome Statute.
There have been two cases in which the Security Council has referred a situation
to the ICC – Sudan in 200558 and Libya in 2011.59 An examination of these cases and
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their aftermath will clarify what the ICC and the Security Council view the Security
Council’s obligations to be. Both referrals took the form of Security Council Resolutions.
As discussed in the preceding section, Security Council resolutions are binding on UN
member states.
Security Council Resolution 1593 referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC,
marking the first time the Security Council exercised its authority to refer a situation to
the Court. The resolution differentiated between obligations of States Parties and nonStates Parties, but nevertheless created an obligation for states as follows, by deciding:
That the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in
Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to
the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while
recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation
under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other
international organizations to cooperate fully.60
While this language is somewhat strong, certain aspects of the resolution are clearly the
result of political compromises within the Security Council. For example, paragraph 6 of
the resolution explicitly shields certain individuals from ICC jurisdiction, presumably
under the deferral power cited in the resolution’s preamble.61 The resolution subsequently
recognizes that the UN will not be responsible for any expenses incurred in connection to
the investigations or prosecutions with respect to Darfur, and that “such costs shall be
59
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borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute
voluntarily.”62 While this bar on UN financing of ICC operations is not without similar
precedents, the Security Council arguably goes out of its way and definitely exceeds its
authority to ensure that it will have no financial obligations with respect to investigations
and prosecutions in Darfur.63 The resolution could have and arguably should have
remained silent on this issue; the inclusion of such language lends the resolution at large
a fairly hands-off tone.
ICC proceedings with respect to Sudan have made little progress; all but one of
the accused remain either at large or otherwise not in ICC custody. Most notably,
Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir has evaded arrest since the Pre-Trial
Chamber issued the first of two arrest warrants against him on 4 March 2009.64 Despite
these arrest warrants, Bashir has frequently traveled outside of Sudan, most recently to
India, and perhaps most notably to South African in June 2015. During his trip to South
Africa, Bashir was allowed to leave the country despite both South Africa’s obligations to
arrest him pursuant to the Rome Statute and to a South African court’s order for him to
remain in the country while it ruled whether he could be arrested.65
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The ICC Prosecutor has repeatedly appeared before the Security Council for
briefings with respect to the Bashir situation. In June 2015, Prosecutor Bensouda
addressed the Council, saying:
It is past time for this Council and States to join forces with the Court and
civil society in devising concrete and effective strategies for the arrest of
accused persons wanted by the Court, and to give the ICC the full support
it requires and is entitled to, in order to implement the Rome Statute as
intended.66
Later in the briefing, Bensouda both urged the Security Council to give urgent
attention to specific examples of noncooperation by Sudan 67 and urged States
Parties “to take the lead in assessing how best individuals for whom warrants
have been issued by the Court can be arrested and surrendered to the ICC.”68 The
President, quoting the ICC judges, repeated the ultimate message of this and other
briefings as follows:
If there is no follow-up action on the part of the Security Council,
any referral by the Council to the ICC under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter would never achieve its ultimate goal, namely, to put
an end to impunity. Accordingly, any such referral would become
futile.69
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This message unequivocally acknowledges an obligation on the Security
Council in referral cases beyond the mere act of referring a case, and
demands such action in order for the Court to fulfill its mandate.
D. Proposed Solutions with Respect to Enforcement
1.

Rome Statute as Customary International Law

Based on both the nature of the Rome Statute itself and its interconnectedness
with certain examples of customary international law, some have argued that the Rome
Statute should be treated as customary international law.70 For something to be customary
international law, it must be a widespread state practice that is followed out of a sense of
legal obligation. As articulated by the ICJ in the Continental Shelf case, “[i]t is of course
axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in
the actual practice and opinio juris of States.”71
While this argument that the Rome Statute is or should be customary international
law is not entirely without merit, I would suggest that it is premature to consider the
Rome Statute as customary international law. As of January 2015, 123 states have ratified
the Rome Statute.72 On its face, this fact might constitute widespread state practice.
However, an understanding of the states that are not States Parties to the Rome Statute
perhaps points to another conclusion. For example, India, a state with a rapidly growing
population and economy, is not a party to the Rome Statute. Even more notably, three of
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the five permanent members of the Security Council – China, Russia, and the United
States – are not States Parties.
Further, even if the Rome Statute were unequivocally customary international
law, this would have a limited impact on the ability of the ICC to enforce the legal
obligations of states. Because the problem of enforcement has frequently arisen with
states that do not necessarily have the greatest record of complying with customary
international law, it is likely that any shift would be symbolic rather than tangible.
It might be helpful in fortifying a moral obligation on states and the Security Council.
2. Conduct Trials in absentia
One obvious way in which the Court could circumvent the problem of
noncooperation by States, at least when noncooperation takes the form of failing to arrest
and transfer an accused, is to conduct trials in absentia. A trial in absentia is a criminal
proceeding in a court of law in which the person who is subject to it is not physically
present for the proceedings. Trials conducted in absentia are rare; in the United States,
the Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that federal law “prohibits the trial in absentia of a
defendant who is not present at the beginning of trial,” and many other states have similar
prohibitions.73 International law clearly recognizes a right of the accused to be present at
trial,74 although trials in absentia have been conducted at the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon. Most importantly here, however, the Rome Statute unequivocally prohibits
73
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trials in absentia at the ICC.75 Thus, in order for the Court to conduct trials in the absence
of the accused, the Rome Statute would need to be amended. This would require
submission of the amendment to the UN Secretary-General, circulation among all States
Parties, a majority of States Parties present at a meeting of the ASP to vote to take up the
proposal, and a two-thirds majority approval of States Parties at either a meeting of the
ASP or a Review Conference.76
Aside from these problems with the Rome Statute and international law, this
would be problematic on a practical level. Because the Court relies on the cooperation of
States Parties for far more than arrest and transfer of individuals, conducting trials in
absentia would only solve a portion of the potential enforcement problems the Court
faces.
3. Article 70 Proceedings and Sanctions
As discussed in Section III(A), the ICC is able to prosecute individuals for
interfering with the administration of justice under Article 70 of the Rome Statute. The
first prosecutions of this kind began in September 2015; Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and
four others are being tried for serious witness tampering.77 Bemba is the former vice
president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo charged by the ICC with war crimes
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allegedly carried out in Central African Republic between 2002 and 2003. It is during this
trial that he and others allegedly intimidated, manipulated, bribed, and coached
witnesses.78 Similarly, a March 2015 arrest warrant against two Kenyan nationals was
issued based on “reasonable grounds” for believing that the individuals “are criminally
responsible for offences against the administration of justice consisting in corruptly
influencing Prosecution witnesses.”79
While these proceedings are on the one hand a sign of progress for the ICC in that the
Court is able to effectively enforce parts of the Rome Statute, this enforcement power is
significantly limited. The language in Article 70 gives the Court jurisdiction over a wide
variety of offenses, including giving false testimony, obstructing or interfering with the
attendance or testimony of a witness, and intimidating an official of the Court.80
However, another subsection of the article provides for either “a term of imprisonment
not exceeding five years, or a fine in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, or both,” in the event of a conviction.81
4. Maximize the Court’s Relationship with Security Council
As discussed above, Security Council referrals should have the same binding
authority on member states as other Security Council Resolutions, and as such, should
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create legal obligations on States to cooperate with the ICC in referral cases. However,
even if referral resolutions are not inherently binding on UN Member States, the authority
of the Security Council under Article 39 of the UN Charter is arguably broad enough to
encompass the Security Council’s continued assistance in ICC cases post-referral. More
broadly, the authority enumerated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter is entirely
compatible with a discretionary authority of the Security Council to deal with ICC cases
post-referral. The UN Charter explicitly gives the Security Council the authority to 1)
make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore
international peace and security;82 and 2) decide what measures are to be employed to
give effect to its decisions, including “complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”83 In fact, this authority was
exercised with respect to the situation in Sudan when, two days before issuing the referral
resolution, the Security Council placed a travel ban and asset freeze on those impeding
the peace process in Sudan.84 Because the ICC case with respect to Sudan is clearly a
significant part of this peace process, this authority can and should be translated to
imposing sanctions against states that violate the terms of Security Council referrals by
failing to cooperation with the ICC. In order for resolutions 1591 and 1593 (not to
mention resolution 1970 and similar resolutions that will surely follow) to be effective,
the Security Council must meaningfully enforce its sanctions, and potentially impose
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additional sanctions specifically in response to noncooperation. Based on the inaction of
the Security Council in this respect, even after repeated appeals from the ICC Prosecutor,
it is unlikely that the Security Council will exercise its authority in this way at any point
in the near future.
However, beyond the Security Council’s authority and regardless of the political
factors involved, the nature of the crimes dealt with by the ICC should arguably create a
moral obligation on States to cooperate with the Court.
The actions of the ICC and its officials, in particular with respect to the aftermath
of the Sudan referral, would appear to indicate that the Court believes that the above
should describe the nature of its relationship with the Security Council. As such, it is
unclear what additional steps the Court or its officials could take in order to make this
aspirational relationship a reality.
IV.

Conclusion
In order for the ICC to be effective going forward, and in order for the spirit of

both the Rome Statute and the Relationship Agreement to be realized, States Parties must
recognize their explicit legal obligations to the Court, and the Security Council must
recognize that it has an implied obligation to provide the Court with meaningful
cooperation and assistance.
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